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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to study the determinants of the outcome of patent
applications (withdrawal, refusal or grant). The application process at the European
Patent O¢ ce (EPO) is modelled in three stages, using a Trivariate Probit model
with double selectivity correction in order to test whether the applicants patenting
history has an e¤ect on the outcome of the current application. I investigate the
behavior of the applicant after the patent o¢ ce has established the "state of the art",
a precondition to an invention being patentable. The main results of the paper are
that (i) Experienced applicants behave di¤erently than unexperienced ones. Firms
having large patent portfolios follow a "trial and error" strategy by applying for
large numbers of patents and stay the course only when the expected probability of
grant is high, (ii) there is no evidence for declining quality of patent examination
once observable characteristics related to the "quality", the value or the cost of
applications are controlled for and (iii) the outcome of prior art search by the EPO
is a critical driver of applicantsbehavior and of the propensity of the patent o¢ ce
to grant the patent or not.
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1 Introduction
A surge in patenting took place in the early 1990s in the three main patent o¢ ces, the
U.S. Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO), the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO) and the
Japanese Patent O¢ ce (JPO). This increased volume of patent applications, documented
in e.g. OECD (2004), raises doubts about patent o¢ cescapacity to maintain high ex-
amination standards. This issue is crucial, given the impact of patents on innovation and
on rmscompetitive strategy.
However, very little is known about the inner workings of patent o¢ ces and even less
about the behavior of patent applicants throughout the procedure. There are at least
two reasons. First, before the 2000 reform in the US, only granted patents were disclosed
at the USPTO whereas all patents that were withdrawn by the applicant or refused a
grant by the patent o¢ ce remained secret. The second reason is the di¢ culty to access
procedural data and specic patent-based information. In this paper I take advantage of
a newly created dataset recently made available by the EPO and the OECD containing
detailed information on the allocation of citations to all patents applied for at the EPO,
that I merged with procedural data of patents applied for by Danish rms at the EPO.
Recent research shows that the use of patents has changed dramatically in the past
decade (see for example, Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, 2007 or Lerner, 2007), with rms apply-
ing for an increasing share of marginal inventions. There is also a good deal of anecdotal
evidence suggesting that some applicants try to obtain patents of dubious merit1 , and
given the possible impact of these changes on the overall "quality" of patent examination,
one can legitimately wonder what the consequences for applicants and patent o¢ ces are.
The aim of this paper is twofold. The rst more general objective is to identify the
main factor that determine the outcome of a patent application at the EPO. The second
motivation is to conduct an exploratory investigation the behavior of patent applicants
at the di¤erent stages of the application procedure in order to test whether experienced
applicants behave di¤erently throughout the procedure.
Within the EPO procedure, the patent o¢ ce establishes the state of the art by issuing
a search report that contains a list of prior art. The applicants then have the possibility
to withdraw their applications if they consider that the search report is negative, i.e. if it
contains evidence that the claimed invention is not novel or does not involve an inventive
step, or to maintain it if their expected probability of getting a grant is high. Substantial
examination follows if the application is maintained until the patent o¢ ce makes its nal
decision. The EPO procedure di¤ers from the USPTO and the JPO, in which the search
and substantive examination are undertaken in one phase.
In this paper, the outcomes of the patent procedure are modeled by taking into account
1The "one-click patent" obtained by amazon is probably the best known example.
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the sequential aspect of the applicants and patent o¢ ces decisions within an econometric
framework using a Trivariate Probit Model with double selection. In addition, applicants
heterogeneity and patent citation measures are taken into account by using a database
linking patents, citations and rms data, where earlier work only studied the e¤ect of
patent-based variables.
The main results of the paper are that (i) Experienced applicants behave di¤erently
than unexperienced ones. Firms having large patent portfolios follow a "trial and error"
strategy by applying for large numbers of patents and stay the course only when the
expected probability of grant is high, (ii) there is no evidence for declining quality of
patent examination once observable characteristics related to the "quality", the value or
the cost of applications are controlled for and (iii) the outcome of prior art search by the
EPO is a critical driver of applicantsbehavior and of the propensity of the patent o¢ ce
to grant the patent or not.
Section 2 briey summarizes the application process at the EPO. Section 3 presents
the economic background; the data are introduced in Section 4, while Section 5 describes
the variables used and Section 6 provides summary statistics. The empirical model and
the results are presented in Section 7, which is followed by concluding remarks.
2 Application process, outcomes and cost of patenting
at the EPO
I rst describe the application procedure at the EPO and then the associated costs.
2.1 The patent application process
The EPO was founded in 1978 as the result of the European Patent Convention (EPC).
Within this framework, a single and centralized application is made, designating the
signatory states of the EPC in which protection is sought for. The EPO system allows
the applicants to choose the jurisdictions, among the contracting states of the EPC, in
which protection is sought for. Thus, a patent provides the applicant with protection in all
the designated states. If patent protection is sought for in more than three EPC countries,
an EPO patent application is less costly than direct applications in each national patent
o¢ ce. Applicants may, however, apply for a patent at the EPO for an invention that had
previously been applied for at a national patent o¢ ce, within twelve months after the
rst application (priority application).
4
Figure 1: Examination of patent applications at the EPO
(adapted from Harho¤ and Wagner, 2005)
Prior art search Examination of the application
Patent Application Final decision
Application withdrawn Patent refused
Patent granted
Request for
examination
Application withdrawn
Search report
Max. 6 months
Figure 1 provides a simple presentation of the application process at the EPO. The
application is published 18 months after the European or national priority application
was led. A search report describing the state of the art is published either with the
application or later on. It contains references to prior patents or scientic publications,
classied in di¤erent categories according to their relevance for the nal decision. After the
search report is published, applicants have six months to decide whether or not to pursue
their application by requesting substantive examination. If no request for examination
is led within the six months, or the renewal fee or any other fee were not paid in due
time the application is deemed to be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the application can
also be explicit, under the form of written correspondence between the applicant and
the patent o¢ ce, at any time before or during the examination process. A withdrawal
typically takes place when the search report issued by the patent o¢ ce contains evidence
that the claimed invention is not novel, or does not involve an inventive step, in the sense
that the applicant expects the patent not to be granted.
If examination was requested by the applicant, the application is examined by the
patent o¢ ce according to three criteria: novelty, inventive step and industrial applicabil-
ity. The application then may end up with a grant or a refusal to grant. Yet, a request
for examination does not necessarily lead to a nal grant/refusal decision by the EPO, in
the sense that the applicants still have the possibility to withdraw their application after
having requested examination2 . Under examination, applicants receive additional infor-
mation on the patentability of the invention and can then choose whether to withdraw
the application, or to wait until the EPOs nal decision.
According to the EPC, if a European patent is granted, competence is transferred to
the designated contracting states, where it a¤ords the same level of legal protection as
a national patent and is valid for 20 years from the date of ling, if it is consecutively
renewed.
2 I thank Stefan Wagner for pointing this fact out.
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If the applicants seek patent protection in several countries, they have the possibility
to le an application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT, e¤ective since the early
1980s), to be led at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Since a large
share of applications in this study are led under the PCT, it is worth describing the
procedure briey. The PCT is an international agreement for ling patent applications
having e¤ect in all designated countries. Although the PCT system does not provide
for the grant of an international patent, it does simplify the process of ling patent
applications. Under the PCT, an inventor can le a single international patent application
in one language, with one patent o¢ ce in order to simultaneously seek protection for an
invention in up to 183 countries. Such a procedure gives the applicant more time to decide
whether or not to apply for the patent and in which of the 183 PCT member countries.
Our database contains PCT applications in which the applicants have designated the
EPO, so called "Euro-PCT" applications.
Chapter I of the PCT procedure consists of sending the application to an International
Searching Authority (ISA), which is a national or regional patent agency, for carrying out
the search on the state of the art. The EPO is responsible for more than half of the
searches. Once the report is provided by the ISA, the applicant has three possibilities (1)
transfer the application to national or regional patent o¢ ces among those designated in
his application, (2) elect an International Preliminary Examination, or (3) withdraw the
application.
Chapter II of the PCT procedure comes into play once the international preliminary
examination is chosen by the applicants. If the Euro-PCT application is transferred to
the EPO, the outcome of the preliminary search report is taken into account.
As indicated by Harho¤ and Wagner (2005), a PCT ling can be advantageous for the
following reasons: (1) it allows the expansion of patent protection to a large number of
countries without incurring the full costs and complexity of national application paths,
(2) the applicant receives an international search report within a relatively short time
period, informing them about prior art that may be relevant for the own applications
likelihood of being granted and (3) it allows the applicant to delay decisions about the
number of designated countries up to 30 months after the priority date, which is helpful
if the value of the invention is uncertain for the applicant.
2.2 The cost of patent applications
The cost an applicant incurs throughout the whole patenting procedure is an important
factor for the decision to maintain or terminate the application. The applicant will main-
tain the application in the process as long as the prospects for future prots are greater
than the cost of the application. Thus it is worth mentioning the main components of the
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cost of a patent application at the EPO. However, given the variety of situations an ap-
plicant can face and the complexity of the procedure, this cost can hardly be summarized
with a single gure. In this subsection, I give a brief overview of the fees an applicant
will have to pay at the di¤erent stages of the application procedure.
The nature of the fees and costs can be divided into three categories:
 Pre-ling costs comprise all the elements related to the drafting of the rst ap-
plication.
 Procedural fees have to be paid once the application has been led at the EPO.
These costs are summarized in Table 1 and do not include the administrative costs
an applicant can be asked to pay.
Table 1: Procedural fees
Nature of fee Amount (€)
Filing fee * 90.00
Search fee 690.00
Designation fee ** 75.00
Renewal fee for the application 3rd year 380.00
4th year 405.00
5th year 430.00
6th year 715.00
7th year 740.00
8th year 765.00
9th year 970.00
>10th year 1,020.00
Examination fee 1,430.00
Grant fee *** 715.00
* if filed online, € 160.00 otherwise
** per contracting designated state, up to seven countries
*** incl. printing up to 35 pages, €10.00 per additional page
source: "Schedule of fees and costs", supplement to official Journal
OJ EPO 2/2005
Notice that this schedule only applies to "Euro-direct" applications. If the application
has been applied through the PCT route, additional fees have to be paid. For example,
the fee for the preliminary examination of an international application is e 1; 530. The
same applies if the patent was applied for at a national patent o¢ ce prior to the EPO
application. The applicant also has the possibility to hire a patent attorney or a legal
representative for guidance throughout the procedure which leads to additional expenses.
 Post-grant costs are probably the most expensive part of the procedure. Once a
patent is granted by the EPO, the applicants have to translate the document in each
o¢ cial language of each designated state. Van Pottelsberghe and François (2006)
estimate this cost at about e 1; 700 per language. In addition, the patent has to be
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enforced and maintained in each jurisdiction by paying the renewal fees in each of
them.3
Van Pottelsberghe and François (2006) estimate that the procedural and transla-
tion cost of the "average" patent that designates three countries (the UK, Germany and
France) is e 8; 070. The same patent that designates 13 countries will cost about e
20; 175. These gures can be compared to the cost of application (excluding renewal fees)
at the USPTO (e 1; 856) and at the JPO (e 1; 541).
It is di¢ cult to quantify the cost of application at the EPO with accuracy. Thus, in
the analysis, I will use indirect measures such as the number of designated states, PCT
applications, number of claims or if a patent attorney acted as a legal representative.
3 Background
3.1 Literature background
As mentioned in the introduction, literature on the inner workings of patent o¢ ces is
scarce. Van Dijk and Duysters (1998) nd that, not surprisingly, basic research, which
explores more novel and unknown paths, meets the patentability requirement more often,
whereas Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002) show that some patent specic
characteristics like for example application ways can partly explain the probability to get
a grant. Harho¤ and Wagner (2005), Popp et al. (2004) as well as Régibeau and Rockett
(2007) study the duration of patent examination, in order to test whether "important"
patent are processed faster by the patent o¢ ce and nd contradictory results. Cockburn et
al. (2002) study the relationship between patent examiners characteristics and litigation
outcomes. One of their main nding is that there is no e¤ect of examiners experience or
workload on the probability that the patent will be found invalid in lawsuit.
The usual way to model patenting behavior in economic theory is to consider two
or more rms "racing" for an invention. The winner of the race will then patent the
invention, that is assumed to be granted with probability one. However, the outcome of
a patent application is essentially the result of a strategic interaction between the patent
o¢ ce and the applicant. Literature on the strategic interaction between applicants and
patent o¢ ces in the theoretical literature is meager too. For example, Langinier and
Marcoul (2007) study such a model allowing the applicant not to reveal all prior art in
order to increase the probability to be granted a patent, whereas Caillaud and Duchêne
3These renewal fees have to be paid separately in each designated state after a grant by the EPO in
addition to the renewal fees for the application. The payment of the latter ends once the application is
granted, withdrawn or refused.
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(2006) assume that the overload problem of the patent o¢ ce leads examiners to make
erroneous judgment, issuing patent on low quality inventions. Régibeau and Rockett
(2007) assume that the applicant maximizes its private prot, while the patent o¢ ce
maximizes a social welfare function. In their model, the decision made by the patent
o¢ ce is imperfect, in the sense that there is a probability of erroneous judgement, i.e.,
that the patent o¢ ce confers patent protection to a invention that is not novel or that
the patent o¢ ce rejects an application that meets the patentability requirements. The
probability of error is a decreasing function of time, as longer examination periods enable
more thorough reviews, lowering the probability of error that will enter the rms prot
function.
To explain early or late withdrawals, one could think that the distance between the
actual quality of the invention and the quality standard set by the patent o¢ ce enters
the erroneous judgement function. The higher this distance is, the easier it is for the
patent o¢ ce to demonstrate lack of novelty or inventive step. The actual quality of
the application is however observed with some noise by the patent o¢ ce, which might be
inuenced by its capability to perform e¢ cient searches and examinations or by the desire
of the applicant to hide the true potential of the application. In some cases, unexperienced
applicants might even be unaware of the quality of their own inventions, compared to the
quality standard of the patent o¢ ce.
In that event, applicants might withdraw their applications because the search report
demonstrates that conicting prior art exists. These early withdrawals take place when
the quality of the invention is low compared to the patent o¢ ces standard.
If the lack of novelty is more di¢ cult to demonstrate, possibly because the appli-
cant tries to hide the true quality of the application, substantial examination will be
requested, where the rm gets additional information on the patentability of the inven-
tion and updates the expected probability of grant. In this scenario, the application will
be maintained as long as the probability of erroneous judgment enables positive private
prots.
3.2 Uncovering the process through which experience in patent-
ing a¤ects the current outcome
A variety of studies have explored the impact of experience on di¤erent economic variables.
There is a substantial literature that shows that new rms su¤er from a liability of newness
(Delmar and Shane, 2006). For example Peters (2007) shows that innovation experience
enhances signicantly the probability to innovate in the future while Kaiser and Kongsted
(2007) and Roberts and Tybout (1997) show that rmspast export behavior has a strong
and positive e¤ect on the current export status of rms.
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Does this type of reasoning also apply to patenting activity? Are experienced ap-
plicants more successful with their current applications? Given the complexity of the
patenting procedure and the cost of a patent application one could hypothesize that ex-
perienced applicants can benet from prior patent applications. As any new economic
activity, applying for a patent can be "learned" and implies specic costs. A common
explanation for the e¤ect of experience on any type of economic activity is the presence
of sunk costs. Theory predicts that in the presence of sunk investments, current per-
formance is a¤ected by prior experience (Dixit, 1989). If a rm decides to start some
patenting activity, it has to incur costs that cannot be recovered, by, for example setting
up an IP department, or by training and hiring IPR personnel (lawyers, representatives,
etc). Thus, these sunk costs will represent risky investments for unexperienced rms since
success is uncertain.
Other explanations of the e¤ect of past applications, might be that applicants have
learned how to draft the documents well, if only due to a greater familiarity with the
application procedure which increases the chances of future success, or that they have
created informal networks at the patent o¢ ce and are receiving a favorable treatment
due to these social ties to the patent o¢ ce. Finally, experienced applicants might be
more successful because they know the relevant prior art in the area they are active in.
4 Data sources
The data was compiled from four main sources:
1. The CEBR patent database contains all the patents applied for by at least one
Danish rm at the EPO since the creation of the EPO in 1978 and up to 2003.
The initial database contains 12,109 patent applications. A major advantage of this
database is that a unique rm identier has been attached to the patent assignees,
the so-called CVRnumber (central rm registry number) to nd exact matches
between the rm names and addresses in the patent data and the rm name and
addresses in the nancial data (the KOB data, see below).
We identify a total of 2,822 unique Danish non-person patent applicants, a total of
1,152 Danish private applicants (see below for the denition of "private applicants")
and a total of 591 foreign (co-) applicants. Both the Danish private applicants
and the foreign applicants have been assigned unique identication numbers. We
therefore have the entire population of patents applied for by Danish rms at the
EPO, with an exact match with the rm-level data. More details on the database
and how it was constructed can be found in Kaiser and Schneider (2005).
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2. The EPO/OECD citations database contains information on citations made in
the patent applications, as well as information on the citations received by all EPO
patents applied before October 2004. More information on the citation database
can be found in Webb et al. (2005)
3. The KOB data provides us with rm level data. KOB A/S is a private rm that
has specialized in collecting and processing data on Danish businesses. Our dataset
is an image of the data that can be found on http://www.kob.dk/. This dataset is
described in detail in Bennedsen et al. (2006)
4. Finally, the number of claims has been searched manually for each patent appli-
cation via http://ep.espacenet.com/
In order to include the number of forward citations (the number of citations received
from subsequent patents) within ve years after the patent application and allow for
ample examination time, I restrict the dataset to patents that were applied for before
January 1st 1998.
5 Variables
The dependent variables and explanatory variables are described in turn.
5.1 Dependent variables
All dependent variables are binary. The purpose is to explain both the decision to with-
draw an application, after search report and during examination, or to maintain it, and
the subsequent decision made by the patent o¢ ce to grant the patent or not. The appli-
cation procedure outlined in Section 2 shows that withdrawals can take place before or
during the substantial examination phase. These decisions might be driven by di¤erent
factors, thus they are going to be analyzed in di¤erent equations.
My empirical model considers three dependent variables of which the nal decision
by the EPO is observed if the application has not been withdrawn during examination,
which in turn is conditional upon a request for examination after the search report has
been received by the applicant.
Request for Examination/withdrawal after search report. This variables takes the value
1 if the applicants have requested for examination and 0 if the application was withdrawn
before examination.
Final decision/withdrawal during examination. For each patent application, we know
whether the applicant decided to maintain it until the EPO makes a nal decision, or to
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withdraw it. The variable takes the value 1 if the application is maintained and 0 if it is
withdrawn during examination.
Decision of the EPO. If the applicant indeed decided to maintain the application, we
observe the decision by the EPO to grant (= 1) or to refuse (= 0) the patent.
5.2 Explanatory variables
This section introduces the explanatory variables used in the multivariate analysis, as
well as the expected e¤ects of experience and control variables on the outcome of patent
applications.
5.2.1 Experience variable
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the e¤ect of patenting history on the outcome
of current applications. In particular, I would like to test rst whether applicants with
a bigger patent applications portfolio have a higher probability to be successful. Second,
I want to assess whether experienced applicants have di¤erent strategies than unexperi-
enced ones throughout the procedure. Thus, the main explanatory variable will be:
Stock of patent applications. The e¤ect of this (lagged) stock variable with declin-
ing balance depreciation will be tested. The variable is constructed using the perpetual
inventory method and is dened as:
Ait = (1  )Ait 1 +Nit (1)
Where Ait is the stock of applications of rm i at time t, Nit is the number of patents
applied for by rm i at time t and  is the depreciation rate of the patent stock from
year t  1 to year t. As noted by Czarnitzki et al. (2005), the use of a depreciation rate
is justied by the fact that knowledge tends to decay or become obsolescent over time,
losing economic value due to advances in technology. We will make the usual assumption
that  = 15%, see for example Hall (1990). In case of multiple applicants, the sum of the
stocks of the collaborating rms is taken.
A similar variable has been used in Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) in an empirical
model of patent litigation in the US. The authors use the portfolio of granted patents,
while in this paper I use the stock of all patent applications made by a given rm, since
the hypothesis is that something can be learned even from unsuccessful prior applications.
5.2.2 Control variables
Following the literature on patent "quality", instrinsic attributes of the patent and the
underlying technology need to be controlled for. In principle, applications with a higher
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quality should have better chances to be granted and if not, should be abandoned less
quickly by the applicant as shown by Harho¤ and Wagner (2005). I only include "time-
zero" value correlates in the analysis in order to avoid endogeneity problems. "Time-zero"
variables reect either the perception of the value of the invention that the applicant has
or the assessment of the "quality" of the invention that the patent o¢ ce makes at the
time of the application. These variables are:
Number of citations made (backward citations). The search report issued by
the EPO lists all the documents regarding prior art that are relevant for the examiners
decision on patentability. Harho¤ et al. (2005) describe in detail how to use citations as-
signed to EPO patents. Empirical evidence tend to conrm a positive impact of backward
citations on the "quality" or the private value of a patent (Gambardella et al, 2006).
For our purpose, an interesting feature of the search report made by the EPO is that
the patent references are classied in di¤erent categories by the examiner according to
their relevance. Thus, in addition to the total number of backward patent citations, I will
use:
 The number of "type X" citations. References classied in this category indicate
that the claimed invention cannot be considered to be novel or cannot be considered
to involve an inventive step when the referenced document is taken alone.
 The number of "type Y" citations, indicating that the claimed invention cannot be
considered to involve an inventive step when the referenced document is combined
with one or more other documents of the same category, such a combination being
obvious to a person skilled in the art.
 The number of "type D" citations, referring to patent references already mentioned
in the description of the patent application and approved by the examiner. Harho¤
et al. (2006) report that only 7:5% of all citations are classied in this category.
It is obvious that a high number of type X and type Y citations reects a negative
search report, since they imply that the invention is not novel or less "radical", which is
expected to lead the applicant to withdraw the application or the patent o¢ ce to refuse
the grant.
Type D citations are references already mentioned by the applicant when the appli-
cation was submitted. This type of citations could reect the fact that the applicant has
a good command of prior art. The probability to maintain the application up to the nal
decision is expected to increase with the number of type D citations.
Number of IPC assignments. During the examination period, a patent is assigned
to a number of codes from the International Patent Classication (IPC) system, according
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to its applicability for di¤erent technology areas. Lerner (1994) interprets the number of
(IPC) assignments of a patent as the "scope" of this patent, whereas other authors prefer
to take it as a measure of the complexity of the invention (Harho¤ and Wagner, 2005).
Number of claims. In the same way as the number of IPC assignments, the number
of claims, which delimit the boundaries of a patent by describing precise features of
the invention, can be interpreted as the "scope" or "breadth" of a patent as well as an
indicator of complexity, see Harho¤ and Reitzig (2004) or Lanjouw and Schankerman
(2004).
Both these variables can thus be interpreted in contradictory ways, as each additional
claim and/or IPC assignments could either mirror a broad patent by increasing its scope
or breadth, or make the description of the invention more precise, narrow and specic,
thus reducing the scope of the patent. However, theses two variables have been found to
be "time-zero" value indicators.
Number of designated states. The "Family size" is the number of jurisdictions
in which patent protection is sought for. We do not, however, observe the entire patent
family, thus I use the number of designated states member of the European Patent Con-
vention (EPC)4 . Harho¤ et al. (2003) and Lanjouw et al. (1998) show that family size is
a patent value correlate.
The total number of designated states has been found to be a "time-zero" value
correlate (like the number of IPC assignments and the number of claims, see above).
This is very intuitive, since applicants have to pay an additional fee for each jurisdiction
in which protection is sought for, thereby increasing the geographical scope of protection.
PCT application. A dummy variable indicates whether PCT Chapter I or II appli-
cations have been led for the invention.
Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2002) give arguments for and against a positive role
of PCT applications. The PCT procedure provides the applicants with a longer period
to decide whether to apply for a patent or not, which enables them to assess the market
potential of their invention more thoroughly. The decision to transfer the applications
to the EPO might therefore be an indicator of higher quality. On the other hand, the
PCT procedure might be a sign of inventions with unclear market potential. In their
analysis, Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002) nd that applications that went
4The EPO members are Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, United Kingdom (from Oct. 7, 1977), Sweden (joined May 1, 1978), Italy (Dec. 1, 1978),
Austria (May 1, 1979 ), Lichtenstein (April 1, 1980), Greece and Spain (Oct. 1, 1986), Denmark (Jan.
1, 1990 ), Monaco (Dec. 1, 1991), Portugal (Jan. 1, 1992), Ireland (Aug. 1, 1992), Finland (March 1,
1996), Cyprus (April 1, 1998)
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trough the rst part of the PCT application procedure only (PCT I for short) have a
lower grant rate, which they interpret as an unclear market potential. They argue that
applicants only want to benet from the longer delay to decide in which jurisdictions to
apply, whereas applicants going through the whole PCT procedure (PCT II) are more
aware of the value of their inventions.
Legal Representative. Any applicant at the EPO may be represented by a profes-
sional representative on the list maintained to this purpose by the EPO (Art. 134(1) of
the EPC), a legal practitioner (Art. 134(7) EPC)5 , or an employee (Art. 133(3) EPC),
typically from the IP department. The employee(s) must work for the applicant and not
for an economically connected company.
I introduce a dummy variable indicating wether the applicant had any legal representa-
tion. Although the e¤ect of legal representation has not been investigated in the economic
literature, it is expected to have a positive inuence on the probability to maintain an
application, as legal representatives are familiar with the procedure.
Ownership structure. I introduce dummy variables which indicate the legal form
of each rm involved in the application, in order to control for this type of rm specic
heterogeneity. These dummies can, to some extent, also be interpreted as a proxy for
rm size, but there are strong within di¤erences.
Large rms, in our case stock listed rms, are expected to have a higher propensity
to pursue their applications, since such rms have more resources and typically have an
IP department.
6 Descriptive statistics
6.1 Outcomes of the patent applications
The number of Danish patent applications has been steadily increasing since 1978, fol-
lowing a trend at the EPO level, see Kaiser et al. (2005). A major challenge related to
this unprecedented increase in patent applications and increasing workload is to maintain
high quality in patent examination.
Figure 2 presents the timing of the application process with the number of occurrences
at the di¤erent stages. A patent grant is the most frequent outcome, followed by with-
drawals during examination. Relatively few applications are directly refused a grant by
the EPO.
5A legal practioner may act as representative if he/she fullls the following criteria:
1. is qualied in one of the Contracting States,
2. has his place of business within such State, and
3. is entitled, within the said State, to act as a professional representative in patent matters.
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Figure 2: Timing of the application process
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Figure 3 displays the distribution of the outcomes of the patent examinations by ap-
plication years from the beginning of 1978 to the end of 1997. A majority of patent
applications, 66%, is granted in the time window covering the application years of this
study, from 1978 to 1997, while a relatively high number of applications, 29%, are with-
drawn by the applicants. As pointed out by Harho¤and Wagner (2005), the withdrawal of
a patent application generally occurs after the applicant received a "su¢ ciently negative
search report or skeptical communication from the examiner". In addition, about 3:6% of
all applications end up with a refusal. The 316 pending applications (for which the out-
come is not known yet) are discarded from the analysis. The sample under consideration
contains 5; 347 observations.
Figure 3: Distribution of outcomes
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Table 2 summarizes the outcome of the applications between 1978 and 1997 by tech-
nology class, using the so called OST classication, provided by the O¢ ce des Sciences
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et Techniques, the French Patent O¢ ce (INPI) and the Fraunhofer ISI Institute, which
is based on a concordance with IPC classes. The table shows an uneven distribution
of outcomes across technology classes. When considering the six aggregated technology
classes, one can see that the grant rate varies from 63:8% in "mechanical engineering"
(technology class V) to 69:9% in "Processing Engineering" (technology class IV). In the 30
more narrow areas, the di¤erences are even stronger, but the low number of applications
in some of the areas makes it di¢ cult to compare them. Notice, however, the relatively
high grant rate, 69:7%, in "organic ne chemicals" (area 9), which is the area where the
Danish patent applicants are most active in (446 applications) and in "Macromolecular
chemistry, polymers" (area 10) in which the grant rate is 80:7% with 119 applications.
Table 2: Outcomes by technology areas
area OST technology class Granted (%) Refused (%) Withdrawn (%) Total % of total
I  Electricity - Electronics 66.30 2.99 30.71 368.00 6.88
1 Electrical devices - electrical engineering 65.87 3.59 30.54 167.00
2 Audiovisual technology 71.43 3.81 24.76 105.00
3 Telecommunications 69.64 1.79 28.57 56.00
4 Information technology 51.52 0.00 48.48 33.00
5 Semiconductors 42.86 0.00 57.14 7.00
II Instruments 68.94 3.05 28.01 689.00 10.73
6 Optics 71.11 6.67 22.22 45.00
7 Analysis, measurement, control 65.64 3.37 30.98 326.00
8 Medical engineering 72.01 2.20 25.79 318.00
III Chemicals, pharmaceuticals 67.41 3.16 29.44 1,488.00 23.17
9 Organic fine chemicals 69.73 3.59 26.68 446.00
10 Macromolecular chemistry, polymers 80.67 1.68 17.65 119.00
11 Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics 59.05 3.81 37.14 210.00
12 Biotechnology 59.38 1.96 38.66 357.00
13 Materials, metallurgy 76.47 1.31 22.22 153.00
14 Agriculture, food 70.44 5.91 23.65 203.00
IV Process engineering 69.86 3.37 26.77 919.00 14.31
15 General technological processes 72.55 1.96 25.49 153.00
16 Surfaces, coatings 51.72 3.45 44.83 29.00
17 Material processing 71.13 3.78 25.09 291.00
18 Thermal techniques 68.89 2.22 28.89 135.00
19 Basic chemical processing, petrol 66.67 2.78 30.56 144.00
20 Environment, pollution 71.86 5.39 22.75 167.00
V Mechanical engineering 63.78 4.57 31.65 1,226.00 19.09
21 Mechanical tools 65.55 5.04 29.41 119.00
22 Engines, pumps, turbines 77.95 2.36 19.69 127.00
23 Mechanical elements 62.77 5.19 32.03 231.00
24 Handling, printing 63.24 3.78 32.97 370.00
25 Agriculture & food machinery 58.33 5.95 35.71 252.00
26 Transport 63.25 4.27 32.48 117.00
27 Nuclear engineering 66.67 0.00 33.33 3.00
28 Space technology, weapons 42.86 14.29 42.86 7.00
VI Other 65.91 3.81 30.29 657.00 10.23
29 Consumer goods & equipment 59.75 3.46 36.79 318.00
30 Civil engineering, building, mining 71.68 4.13 24.19 339.00
Total 66.93 3.57 29.49 5,347.00 100.00
6.2 Firm-level data
There are 2; 510 unique applicants in the dataset, on which information is summarized
in Table 3 with respect to their ownership structure. Table 4 indicates the weight of
each company form in the total number of patent applications. 34% of the rms in
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the dataset are stock listed limited companies (A/S), accounting for 64% of the patents
applied. The database counts a high number of "persons" or private applicants (25:7% of
the applicants) which are involved in 10:7% of the applications. An applicant is dened as
being privateif (i) there is no indication that the applicant is non-private (for example
there is no A/Sfor stock listed rms), (ii) the applicant name is a family name followed
by rst names or (iii) the applicant could neither be found by our manual nor by our
automatic searches. Sole proprietorships, foreign (co-) applicants and private limited
companies (ApS) follow. Notice that the legal form could not be determined for 1:4%
of the applicants, corresponding to 0:7% of the applications. These rms were typically
out of business by the time we made the search and we were not able to nd information
about them. The other company forms account for less than 1% of the applications. The
table shows that the grant rate is rather high for applications in which foreign rms are
involved, as well as for applications by public rms or stock listed companies. The grant
rate is lower than the average for applications involving private applicants (persons) and
sole proprietorships.
Table 3: Firm structures - Number of unique applicants
Legal form Number of firms %
Limited company (A/S) 850 33.9
Person 645 25.7
Foreign firm (with no connexion to Denmark) 369 14.7
Sole proprietorship 283 11.3
Private limited compagny (APS) 246 9.8
Form unknown 35 1.4
General partnership (I/S) 29 1.2
Foundation (FON) 11 0.4
Public firm 8 0.3
Non-profit association 8 0.3
Cooperative with limited liability (AmbA) 7 0.3
Limited partnership (K/S) 5 0.2
Cooperative (AND) 4 0.2
Foreign firm-wich has registered a branch or place of business in Denmark 3 0.1
Branch of foreign limited company (FAP) 2 0.1
Insurance company (FAS) 2 0.1
Commercial foundation (ERF) 1 0.0
Company with limited liability (SmbA) 1 0.0
Limited partnership by shares (P/S) 1 0.0
total 2,510 100.0
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Table 4: Distribution of outcomes by rm structure
Legal form Number of patents % Granted (%) Refused (%) Withdrawn (%)
Limited company (A/S) 4,009 64.5 70.4 3.4 26.2
Person 666 10.7 56.6 4.1 39.3
Foreign firm (with no connexion to Denmark) 563 9.1 74.4 2.8 22.7
Private limited compagny (APS) 380 6.1 63.9 3.7 32.4
Sole proprietorship 347 5.6 59.1 4.6 36.3
Non-profit association 50 0.8 50.0 4.0 46.0
Form unknown 45 0.7 55.6 2.2 42.2
General partnership (I/S) 35 0.6 54.3 5.7 40.0
Public firm 33 0.5 84.8 0.0 15.2
Foundation (FON) 23 0.4 65.2 0.0 34.8
Foreign firm (wich has registered 100.0
a branch or place of business in Denmark) 17 0.3 76.5 0.0 23.5
Limited partnership (K/S) 15 0.2 73.3 0.0 26.7
Cooperative with limited liability (AmbA) 10 0.2 40.0 10.0 50.0
Cooperative (AND) 8 0.1 75.0 0.0 25.0
Branch of foreign limited company (FAP) 6 0.1 100.0 0.0 0.0
Limited partnership by shares (P/S) 5 0.1 20.0 0.0 80.0
Company with limited liability (SmbA) 3 0.0 33.3 33.3 33.3
Insurance company (FAS) 2 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Commercial foundation (ERF) 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
total 6,218 100.0
6.3 Experience and outcome of the patent application: non-parametric
evidence
Since the relationship between experience and outcome of the patent application is central
in our analysis, it deserves further attention. An advantage from having applied for
patents at the EPO in the past is expected. One may therefore expect patenting history
to a¤ect the applicantschances of getting their patents granted. I will study the e¤ect
of application portfolios, as a measure of rmsexperience.
The relationship between the stock of applications and the outcome in Table 5 is not
clear. The grant rate increases with the stock of applications up to a certain threshold
and then decreases, while the refusal rate decreases steadily. This issue will be discussed
in Section 7.2, together with the other results.
Table 5: Applications stock and incidence on outcomes
Application stock Grant Refusal Withdrawal Total
0 1,083 77 695 1,855
58.4% 4.2% 37.5% 100.0%
(0, 10] 1,242 69 431 1,742
71.3% 4.0% 24.8% 100.0%
(10, 100] 846 29 189 1,064
79.5% 2.7% 17.7% 100.0%
>100 408 16 262 688
59.5% 2.3% 38.2% 100.0%
Total 3,579 191 1,577 5,347
66.9% 3.6% 29.5% 100.0%
Pearson chi2(6) =184.1900 Pr = 0.000
Outcome
Pearsons Chi squared test, given at the bottom of the table, rejects the hypothesis of
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independence between applications stock and outcomes. Thus, there seems to be a rela-
tionship between applicantspatenting history and the outcome of the focal application.
6.4 Explanatory variables
Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 6. Firms
have, on average, 44:5 applications in their stock. However, the median, 1:99, indicates
that the distribution is highly skewed and that large application portfolios are owned
by few rms. The number of patent references ranges from 0 to 26, with, on average,
0:83 type X citations, 0:55 type Y citations, and 0:16 type D citations per patent. The
patents have on average two IPC assignments and 12:57 claims. The applicants typically
designate about eleven states. 16:3% of all applications went through the PCT Chapter
I procedure and 48:6% through Chapter I and II. The number of claims ranges from one
to 170.
Table 6: Descriptive statistics
Variables mean sd min max median
Stock of applications 44.55 103.14 0 510.84 1.99
Backward citations 4.22 2.42 0 26 4
Backward citations=0 2.15% 0 1
Number of type X citations 0.83 1.50 0 17 0
Number of type Y citations 0.55 1.24 0 20 0
Number of type D citations 0.16 0.54 0 6 0
Number of IPC assignments 2.09 1.19 1 6 2
Number of claims 12.57 11.94 1 170 10
Number of designated states 11.28 4.17 2 18 11
PCT Chapter I only 16.3% 0 1
PCT Chapter I & II 48.6% 0 1
Legal representative 87.8% 0 1
Number of observations
All applications
5347
Table 6 (continued)
Variables mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max
Stock of applications 6.73 33.07 0 360.32 78.49 141.29 0 510.83 38.53 91.35 0 509.42
Backward citations 5.00 2.88 0 18 4.17 2.53 0 26 4.14 2.30 0 26
Backward citations=0 3.26% 0 1 3.31% 0 1 1.67% 0 1
Number of type X citations 1.00 1.90 0 17 0.97 1.62 0 15 0.77 1.40 0 12
Number of type Y citations 0.55 1.37 0 8 0.62 1.37 0 20 0.52 1.19 0 15
Number of type D citations 0.10 0.42 0 4 0.15 0.51 0 5 0.18 0.56 0 6
Number of IPC assignments 1.73 0.97 1 6 2.14 1.18 1 6 2.11 1.21 1 6
Number of claims 8.53 7.84 1 91 13.41 11.72 1 90 12.78 12.30 1 170
Number of designated states 9.20 3.69 2 18 11.753 4.41 2 18 11.37 4.08 2 18
PCT Chapter I only 46.9% 0 1 17.3% 0 1 12.5% 0 1
PCT Chapter I and II 52.2% 0 1 53.1% 0 1
Legal representative 43.8% 0 1 84.8% 0 1 94.0% 0 1
Number of observations
non-withdrawn applications
430 3770
Applications withdrawn
during examination
1147
after search report
Applications withdrawn
The comparison between the groups of withdrawn and non-withdrawn applications
shows interesting di¤erences. The average stock of applications is surprisingly lower
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for non-withdrawn applications compared to the ones withdrawn under examination. A
possible explanation is that there are strategic decisions involved. One could think that
applicants with large applications portfolios apply for a high number of patents, possibly
for the same invention, and wait for a nal decision by the patent o¢ ce only when the
probability of grant is high, that is, when no conicting prior art has been found and
when positive information has been received from the examiner.
The average number of "type X" and "type Y" references are higher for withdrawn
applications, whereas the number or forward citations is much higher for non-withdrawn
applications.
Two other important variables seem to be the presence of a legal representative and
PCT Chapter II applications. The number of IPC assignments, the number of claims
and the number of designated states are higher for non-withdrawn applications, but the
di¤erence is very small.
7 Empirical analysis
7.1 Econometric specication
Suppose yi1 and y

i2 are latent variables representing the expected net present (private)
prots to the rms (or individuals) applying for patent i, after receiving the search report
and during examination respectively. Moreover, assume that yi3 is the social welfare func-
tion that the patent o¢ ce seeks to maximize. These variables are not directly observable.
However, we can observe whether the applications are withdrawn or not and whether they
are granted or refused by the patent o¢ ce. Suppose that the latent variables are functions
of observable value and quality characteristics of the patent (xi) and an unobserved part
(i) assumed to be jointly normally distributed, which leads to a Trivariate Probit Model
with Double Selection, an extension of the Bivariate Probit Model with Sample Selection
due to Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981). The choice of this model is motivated by the
fact that it may not be appropriate to analyze the patent o¢ ces decision to grant the
patent or to refuse the grant by using a single-equation model, since this decision is also
related to the applicantschoice to withdraw the application or not, prior to the patent
o¢ ces decision. In this model, data on a variable y3 (the EPOs decision to grant the
patent or not) are observed only when another variable, y2 (the applicants decision to
request for the EPOs nal decision or to withdraw the application) is equal to one, which
in turn, is only observed when the third binary variable y1 (the applicants decision to re-
quest for examination or to withdraw the application before the substantial examination
phase) equals one. Formally we have:
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yi1 = 1xi1 + i1; yi1 = 1 if y

i1 > 0, 0 otherwise
yi2 = 2xi2 + i2; yi2 = 1 if y

i2 > 0, 0 otherwise
yi3 = 3xi3 + i3; yi3 = 1 if y

i3 > 0, 0 otherwise (2)0B@ i1i2
i3
1CA s N
264
0B@ 00
0
1CA ;
0B@ 1 12 13: 1 23
: : 1
1CA
375
(yi2; xi2) is observed only when yi1 = 1
(yi3; xi3) is observed only when yi2 = 1
Thus, there are four types of observations with unconditional probabilities that need
to be taken into account in the construction of the log-likelihood function:
L =
X
y1=0
ln ( 1xi1) +
X
y1=1;y2=0
ln2 (1xi1; 2xi2; 12)
+
X
y1=1;y2=1;y3=0
ln3 (1xi1; 2xi2; 3xi3;12; 23; 31) (3)
+
X
y1=1;y2=1;y3=1
ln3 (1xi1; 2xi2; 3xi3;12; 23; 31) ,
where , 2 and 3 denote, respectively, the univariate, bivariate and trivariate nor-
mal cumulative distribution functions, and the ij are the correlation coe¢ cients between
the error terms. The likelihood function is maximized with respect to the k and ij
(k; i; j = 1; 2; 3; i 6= j).
As Equation 2 suggests, sample selection arises because the observation of y3 (the
patent is granted or refused) is not random, but conditional on the observation of y2 = 1
(the applicants do not withdraw the application under examination) and y1 = 1 (the
applicants request for examination). If the correction was not specied, the model would
take into account the outcomes that are not feasible.
If all the ij = 0, the model can be estimated using three independent probit re-
gressions. However, if the ij are signicantly di¤erent from zero, using single equation
estimates will generate inconsistent coe¢ cients.
This model requires the evaluation of a trivariate normal density which is computa-
tionally intractable using numerical or analytical methods. One way to overcome this
problem is to estimate the model by Maximum Simulated Likelihood using the GHK
simulator, (see for example Gourieroux and Montfort, 1996 or Train, 2003). The GHK
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simulator is based on the Cholesky factorization of the covariance matrix, therefore, the
only restriction that needs to be made is that the latter be positive denite.
In order to render the bias and noise induced by simulation negligible, I use 100 Halton
draws. Draws derived from Halton sequences have the advantage of both improving
coverage of the domain of integration and inducing a negative correlation between the
draws from di¤erent observations, which are two desirable properties (see Train, 2003).
Starting values were derived from three independent probit regressions.
Identication of the model requires exclusion restrictions. The grant/refusal equation
is identied by excluding the "legal representative" dummy. Strictly speaking, the role
of a representative is to help the applicant write the application document and to guide
him/her through the application process, but a patent attorney cannot inuence the nal
decision of the examiner.6 In principle we cannot rationally exclude any other patent-
based variable from the selected equations, since each of them might potentially a¤ect
the outcome at each stage of the model. The only variables that can be excluded from
the nal decision/withdrawal and grant/refusal equations but not from the rst selection
equation are the 30 technology dummies presented in Table 2. These variables account for
di¤erences across sub-elds and heterogeneity across these sub-elds might be relatively
strong in the rst stage, because of the di¤erent practices with respect to patent activity
and di¤erent strategies and motives for lling an application. But once the application
enters the substantive examination phase, this heterogeneity is expected to be much lower
because examiners and applicants follow a standardized procedure. Thats why, I only
insert the 6 aggregated technology classes (also presented in Table 2) in the last two stages
of the model.
Before turning to the results, I will discuss a potential caveat of this specication.
The rst decision (y1) is fully tied to the payment of the examination fee (see table 1).
However, the second decision (y2;withdraw during examination or stay the course) does
not only depend on the payment of a given fee. Table 1 shows that if the procedure
takes more than three years, renewal fees have to be paid yearly, provided that exam-
ination was requested. Thus the decision problem of the applicant is not discrete and
is in reality more complex than the one presented here. However, unreported results of
an unconditional survival model give similar results to the ones discussed below.7 The
discrete modelling of this equation is favoured in order to keep the model tractable, thus
the corresponding coe¢ cients of the second equation should be interpreted as "overall"
probabilities. Nevertheless, this specication is su¢ cient to answer the main question of
this paper (does experience matter?) and the results of the di¤erent robustness checks
6 In specications in which this variable is included in the grant/refusal equation, the corresponding
coe¢ cient is indeed not signicant.
7These results are available upon request.
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provided in Section 7.3 corroborate those of this specication.
7.2 Results
Table 7 shows the result of the Trivariate Probit estimation. In this section, I discuss the
implication of the estimation results for the set of hypotheses discussed in Section 5.2.
The stock of applications has a positive e¤ect on the probability to request for exami-
nation in Table 7, while the e¤ect is negative on the probability to pursue the application
under examination and then positive again on the grant rate8 . The intuition of this result
is that rms with large portfolios proceed by "trial and error", meaning that they apply
for a high number of patents (in the hopes of some issuing), maintain the applications
until they receive full information on the patentability of the invention through the search
report and informal communications (or negotiations) with the examiner and thereafter
wait for a nal decision only when the probability of grant is high. This is fully reected
by the positive e¤ect of the variable in the third stage. The results suggest that experi-
enced rms push the application as far as possible in the procedure and only wait for a
nal decision by the EPO when the chances to be granted a patent are high. From a social
welfare perspective, this result does not suggest that experienced rms are able to obtain
patents of dubious validity. My interpretation of this result is that experienced rms have
an optimal application strategy in order to minimize their costs. In other words, they
know better than unexperienced rms when the probability of grant of their applications
is closer to one or to zero. This result shows that experience does indeed matter in the
patent application process and that experienced applicants behave di¤erently than less
experienced ones.
Applications containing high numbers of type X citations tend to be withdrawn more
often. This result is intuitive, given that this type of citations is potentially damaging to
the novelty requirement of the claimed invention. This mirrors a scenario in which rms
withdraw their applications after receiving a negative search report. During examination
the e¤ect of X references is also negative (nal decision/withdrawal under examination
equation), as well as the Y references, which were insignicant at the rst stage. This
result suggests that applicants withdraw their applications after they receive the search
report only when the existence of conicting prior art is obvious (X references). On the
other hand, applications for which the demonstration of the existence of damaging prior
art is more subtle (Y references, that have to be combined with each other in order to
8A quadratic specication of the stock of applications leads to similar results, i.e., the squared term
was non signicant. Interactions between the stock of applications and the di¤erent ownership structures
are insignicant too.
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demonstrate conict with prior art) are more likely to be withdrawn during examination,
possibly because of communications between the examiner and the applicants. This means
that information given to the applicant by the examiner is consistent with the results of
the search report. In the Grant/Refusal equation, the number of type X citations, the
most harmful to the novelty requirement, has a negative impact on the probability of
grant, as expected.
D references (those already mentioned in the application) do not have a signicant
impact on any of the stages of the procedure. One reason, could be that, unlike at
the USPTO, applicants do not have the legal "Duty of Candor" in disclosing prior art
information. In other words, inclusion of references to prior art by the applicant is not
mandatory, thus interpretation of the e¤ect of this variable is not straightforward.
The technical characteristics (number of claims and number of IPC assignments) are
insignicant in the grant/refusal stage, suggesting that the breadth of the application
and/or the precision of the description of the claimed invention has no e¤ect on the
outcome.9 However, applications containing more claims have a higher probability to go
through examination, which suggests that these applications are abandoned less quickly.
Regarding the number of designated states, no signicant e¤ect is observed.10 Time-
zero value correlates have in general almost no e¤ect on the application process. This
result has strong managerial implications, since it could be a sign that applicants are
either unaware of the potential value of their invention, or if they are aware, they do not
act consequently.
This presumption is reinforced by the result on applications that went through the
PCT procedure. PCT Chapter I applications are more likely to be withdrawn during
examination, while PCT Chapter I & II applications have a positive impact at this stage.
This conrms the results found by Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2002). PCT I applica-
tions have unclear market potential given that it provides the applicants with more time
to decide whether to extend the right of the patents, whereas applicants who wait until
their application reaches the Chapter II procedure are usually more aware of the market
potential of the invention.
Professional representatives are found to be successful in pushing the application as
far as possible in the procedure.
9A linear relationship between the number of claims and the outcome gave the same result.
10Di¤erent non-linear specications have been tested regarding the designated states, following Guellec
and Van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002), with the same result.
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Finally, regarding the ownership structures, the stock listed rms, typically big rms,
are the only ones to carry a positive and signicant e¤ect, on the probability to wait until
the grant/refusal decision. Publicly traded rms have typically less nancial constraints
and can thus be assumed to be less risk averse than other type of applicants.
These results highlight another interesting point. The year e¤ects are not signicant
in the grant/refusal equation, which means that after controlling for observable rm
and patent characteristics the average propensity to grant a patent did not vary over
time.11 This is a crucial question from a policy point of view, since concerns are currently
expressed about the "quality" of the examination procedure given the rising workload of
patent o¢ ces worldwide. There are empirical evidence suggesting that the USPTO has
reacted to this increase in the demand for patents by allowing low quality patents to slip
through the procedure (see Lemley, 2001), which led to an increase in the overall grant
rate, while the (actual) grant rate at the EPO decreased from 1980 to 1989 and then
remained fairly constant (see Martinez and Guellec, 2003). A variety of studies suggest
that there is a decline in the standard of patent applications at the USPTO (see for
example Harho¤ and Hall, 2004 for a detailed discussion on this issue). On the basis of
my results, one cannot conclude that the examination standards at the EPO weakened
over time.
11The year dummies are signicantlty positive in the rst two equations from 1988 onwards in the
request for examination/withdrawal equation and from 1978 to 1987 in the second stage of the model.
Thus it seems that applicants tend to withdraw their applications on average later than before.
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Table 7: Estimation results (1)
Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D.
Experience variable
Stock of applications 0.006***   0.001 -0.001 *** 0.0002 0.001*** 0.0004
Patent characteristics
Backward citations=0 -0.713***  0.207 -0.358***  0.140 0.034 0.260
Number of backward citations -0.020 0.015 -0.004 0.010 0.001 0.017
Number of type X citations -0.051**   0.022 -0.036***   0.015 -0.050 ** 0.024
Number of type Y citations -0.025 0.027 -0.058*** 0.017 -0.002 0.028
Number of type D citations 0.014 0.064 0.024 0.040 -0.034 0.062
Number of IPC assignments 0.039 0.035 0.020 0.018 -0.018 0.029
Number of claims 0.012*** 0.004 -0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003
Number of designated states -0.002 0.009 0.001 0.005 -0.011 0.009
PCT Chapter I only 0.395*** 0.102 -0.205*** 0.071 -0.184 0.118
PCT Chapter I & II 0.223*** 0.058 -0.159 0.099
Legal representative 2.228*** 0.098 0.383*** 0.102
Ownership structure
Stock listed firms 0.448***   0.183 0.457*** 0.095 0.211 0.156
Persons 0.469***   0.181 0.075 0.094 0.126 0.153
Foreign firm 0.671***   0.179 0.081 0.066 0.101 0.113
Limited compagnies 0.171 0.192 0.211** 0.108 0.187 0.174
Sole proprietorships 0.685*** 0.211 -0.021 0.106 0.067 0.171
Other type of firms 0.389** 0.199 -0.081 0.106 -0.055 0.170
Constant -1.609*** 0.324 -0.294 0.245 1.732*** 0.326
Technology areas
Bi-annual dummies
ρ12; ρ31; ρ32
Number of Observations
Log-Likelihood
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Grant/refusal
Withdrawal Withdr. during exam.
Request for Exam./ Final Decision/
-0.065 (0.188); -0.562 *** (0.185); -0.709 *** (0.183)
5.347
-4,100.872
30 sub-classes 6 areas 6 areas
IncludedIncludedIncluded
7.3 Sensitivity analysis and robustness checks
The specication of the trivariate model described in the previous Sub-Section included
the same set of patent characteristics in all equations. The assumption was that "valu-
able" inventions are more likely to be granted a patent. However, some of the indicators
used reect the private value of the invention as perceived by the applicant, which does
not necessarily mean that these invention fulll the patentability requirements. Thus, I
estimate the trivariate model by excluding the number of claims, number of IPC assign-
ments and PCT application variables from the grant/refusal equation. The results are
reported in Table 8 and do not change signicantly.
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Table 8: Estimation results (2)
Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D.
Experience variable
Stock of applications 0.006***   0.001 -0.001 *** 0.0002 0.001*** 0.0004
Patent characteristics
Backward citations=0 -0.713***  0.207 -0.358***  0.140 0.031 0.262
Number of backward citations -0.020 0.015 -0.004 0.010 0.002 0.017
Number of type X citations -0.051**   0.022 -0.036***   0.015 -0.056 ** 0.024
Number of type Y citations -0.025 0.027 -0.058*** 0.017 -0.010 0.028
Number of type D citations 0.014 0.064 0.024 0.040 -0.030 0.061
Number of IPC assignments 0.039 0.035 0.020 0.018
Number of claims 0.012*** 0.004 -0.000 0.001
Number of designated states -0.002 0.009 0.001 0.005
PCT Chapter I only 0.395*** 0.102 -0.205*** 0.071
PCT Chapter I & II 0.223*** 0.058
Legal representative 2.228*** 0.098 0.383*** 0.102
Ownership structure
Stock listed firms 0.446***   0.183 0.457*** 0.095 0.234 0.161
Persons 0.467***   0.181 0.075 0.094 0.103 0.154
Foreign firm 0.670***   0.179 0.081 0.066 0.127 0.116
Limited compagnies 0.170 0.192 0.211** 0.108 0.201 0.177
Sole proprietorships 0.684*** 0.211 -0.021 0.106 0.063 0.173
Other type of firms 0.387** 0.199 -0.081 0.106 -0.035 0.171
Constant -1.607*** 0.324 -0.292 0.247 1.626*** 0.331
Technology areas
Bi-annual dummies
ρ12; ρ31; ρ32
Number of Observations
Log-Likelihood
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Request for Exam./ Final Decision/ Grant/refusal
Withdrawal Withdr. during exam.
30 sub-classes 6 areas 6 areas
Included Included Included
-0.079 (0.202); -0.657 *** (0.261); -0.593 ** (0.248)
5.347
-4,104.193
I also perform several robustness checks. Appendix C reports the result of a probit
model of the probability to grant against the other outcomes (i.e. the two types of
withdrawals and the refusals are pooled), one can see that it is much more di¢ cult
to dene which e¤ect is induced by which player and at which stage. Moreover, the
application stock has an overall negative e¤ect, which is di¢ cult to interpret.
Withdrawals during examination can be interpreted as expected refusals, since appli-
cants typically withdraw their applications once the examiner asserted that the applica-
tion is likely to be refused a grant. In Appendix D estimates of a bivariate probit model
with selection are reported, in which refusals and withdrawals that took place under ex-
amination are pooled, since the latter can be considered as refusals. In addition, I also
perform an estimation in which the two types of withdrawals are pooled. The results do
not change very much, but again, the overall negative e¤ect of the stock of applications is
di¢ cult to interpret. The results in Table 7 show that the most "important" or valuable
inventions are maintained until the EPOs nal decision is taken, which suggests that
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refusals and withdrawals should be treated separately.
In Appendix E, I report the estimation results of an ordered probit model. The
dependent variable is assumed to be ordered, because outcomes can be ranked with respect
to their implications for the prots of the applicant, i.e., a refusal is assumed to be the
worst outcome possible for the applicants followed by a withdrawal and a grant. There
is no major di¤erence with the models previously estimated, but again, the stock of
applications carries a negative sign.
8 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to analyze the determinants of the outcomes of patents applied
for by Danish rms at the EPO and to study the impact of the rmsexperience on these
outcomes. I used a database of 5,347 patent applications over the period 1978-1998 and
applied a Trivariate probit model accounting for self-selection.
The applicantspatenting history, as measured by the stock of applications, is found
to be an important factor in all stages of the application process, which shows that expe-
rienced applicants indeed behave di¤erently than unexperienced ones. It seems that rms
having large patents portfolios act following a "trial and error" strategy, by applying for
large numbers of patents and thereafter maintain the application only when the expected
probability of grant is high, leading to a positive e¤ect of the size of the applications
portfolio on the probability of grant.
The paper also investigates the determinants of the withdrawal decision of patent
applications. The results show that the outcome of the search report is a crucial driver of
the applicant and patent o¢ ces behaviors. Applicants tend to withdraw their applications
when the result of the preliminary search report issued by the patent o¢ ce is negative.
Thus, the applicants update their information set after receiving the search report and if
the expected probability of grant is low, that is, the search report shows evidence that
the claimed invention is not novel, they tend to withdraw their application. Withdrawals
also occur during examination, where the applicant can obtain additional information
from the examiner regarding the patentability of the invention. The results show that
this information is consistent with the results of the search report, since withdrawals are
more likely to occur when conicting prior art exists. A withdrawal can then be viewed
as an expected refusal.
Other important results of the paper are the following:
 Time-zero value correlates have little explanatory power.
 After controlling for observable patent characteristics, we cannot conclude that
examination standards at the EPO have been declining over time.
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 the grant/refusal decision made by the patent o¢ ce is more di¢ cult to predict than
earlier studies using an unconditional grant/other outcomes suggest.
From an economic policy point of view these results conrm the ndings of Harho¤and
Hall (2004), that the EPO maintained higher examination standards than the USPTO.
In addition to the economic considerations, implications for the strategic management of
intellectual property rights can also be derived from the empirical model. The fact that
"time-zero" value indicators do not play a big role in explaining the nal outcome could
mean that applicants are either unaware of the potential value of their invention or that
they do not act accordingly (i.e. they try to obtain a patent of dubious validity). The
results also underline that applicants should be aware of the market potential of their
applications and use the appropriate application ways and ling strategies. Filing an
application under the PCT treaty before sending the application to the EPO in order to
gain more time is not necessarily a good strategy and can be very costly for the applicants.
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Appendix
A Probit estimation
Probit model, probability to grant against all other outcomes
Coeff. S.D.
Experience variable
Stock of applications -0.001*** 0.000
Patent characteristics
Backward citations=0 -0.465*** 0.128
Number of backward citations -0.005 0.009
Number of type X citations -0.063*** 0.014
Number of type Y citations -0.061*** 0.015
Number of type D citations 0.050 0.037
Number of IPC assignments 0.028* 0.017
Number of claims 0.001 0.001
Number of designated states -0.006 0.005
PCT Chapter I only -0.101* 0.062
PCT Chapter I & II 0.376*** 0.052
Legal representative 0.963*** 0.066
Ownership structure
Stock listed firms 0.498*** 0.088
Persons 0.124 0.087
Foreign firm 0.141** 0.062
Limited compagnies 0.225** 0.099
Sole proprietorships 0.062 0.099
Others -0.042 0.099
Constant 0.269* 0.163
Technology areas
Bi-annual dummies
Number of Observations
Log-Likelihood
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6 areas
included
5.347
-3,044.655
B Bivariate probit with selectivity
Here we estimate a Bivariate Probit Model with sample selection due to Van de Ven and
Van Praag (1981). In this model, data on a variable y1 are observed only when another
variable, y2 is equal to one. Formally we have:
yi1 = 1xi1 + i1; yi1 = 1 if y

i1 > 0, 0 otherwise
yi2 = 2xi2 + i2; yi2 = 1 if y

i2 > 0, 0 otherwise (4)
(i1; i2) s BV N(0; 0; 1; 1; )
(yi1; xi1) is observed only when yi2 = 1,
where the xi are the characteristics for the ith patent. Thus, there are three types of
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observations with unconditional probabilities that need to be taken into account in the
construction of the log-likelihood function:
L =
X
y1=1;y2=1
ln [2 (1xi1; 2xi2; )] +
X
y1=0;y2=1
ln [2 ( 1xi1; 2xi2; )]
+
X
y2=0
ln [1   (2xi2)] , (5)
where  and 2 denote, respectively, the univariate and bivariate normal cumulative
distribution function, and  = cov(i1; i2). The likelihood function is maximized with
respect to 1, 2 and .
Bivariate probit with selectivity estimation
Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D.
Experience variable
Stock of applications -0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.001 -0.001*** 0.000
Patent characteristics
Backward citations=0 -0.480*** 0.128 0.061 0.258 -0.912*** 0.233 -0.302** 0.137
Number of backward citations -0.006 0.009 0.003 0.016 -0.018 0.016 -0.003 0.009
Number of type X citations -0.050*** 0.013 -0.047** 0.022 -0.064** 0.026 -0.045*** 0.014
Number of type Y citations -0.064 0.016 -0.004 0.027 -0.078** 0.031 -0.051*** 0.016
Number of type D citations 0.061 0.038 -0.042 0.063 0.214*** 0.072 0.006 0.038
Number of IPC assignments 0.033* 0.017 -0.026 0.029 0.066* 0.039 0.012 0.017
Number of claims 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001
Number of designated states -0.002 0.005 -0.009 0.009 -0.001 0.011 -0.002 0.005
PCT Chapter I only -0.072 0.063 -0.168 0.114 0.917*** 0.117 -0.266*** 0.068
PCT Chapter I & II 0.455*** 0.054 -0.187** 0.094 3.296*** 0.315 0.097 0.059
Legal representative 0.988*** 0.064 2.818*** 0.127 0.311*** 0.089
Ownership structure
Stock listed firms 0.463*** 0.089 0.206 0.158 0.449** 0.205 0.471 0.092
Persons 0.089 0.088 0.135 0.157 0.311 0.204 0.103 0.091
Foreign firm 0.125** 0.064 0.126 0.115 0.760*** 0.188 0.085 0.063
Limited compagnies 0.172* 0.102 0.195 0.178 0.188 0.221 0.251** 0.105
Sole proprietorships 0.033 0.101 0.088 0.176 0.472** 0.238 -0.007 0.102
Other type of firms -0.039 0.100 -0.024 0.171 0.408* 0.222 -0.096 0.103
Constant -1.101*** 0.191 1.722*** 0.324 -1.857*** 0.365 -0.291** 0.220
Technology areas
Bi-annual dummies
ρ
Number of Observations
Log-Likelihood
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-0.899 (0.154)***
5.347
-3,044.655
Final decision/
Pooled withdr.
6 areas
grant / refusal
Model 2
30 sub-classes 6 areas
included
Model 1
5.347
-3,418.312
Request for exam./
withdrawal
grant / (refusal or
withdrawal)
included
-0.381 (0.138)**
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C Ordered Probit estimation
Ordered Probit estimation
(0=refusal, 1=withdr., 2=grant)
Coeff. S.D.
Experience variable
Stock of applications -0.001*** 0.000
Patent characteristics
Backward citations=0 -0.370*** 0.118
Number of backward citations -0.003 0.008
Number of type X citations -0.055*** 0.012
Number of type Y citations -0.049*** 0.014
Number of type D citations 0.036 0.035
Number of IPC assignments 0.018 0.016
Number of claims 0.001 0.001
Number of designated states -0.005 0.004
PCT Chapter I only -0.083 0.058
PCT Chapter I & II 0.283*** 0.050
Legal representative 0.662*** 0.057
Ownership structure
Stock listed firms 0.439*** 0.083
Persons 0.125 0.082
Foreign firm 0.146** 0.059
Limited compagnies 0.217** 0.094
Sole proprietorships 0.060 0.093
Other type of firms -0.025 0.092
Cut point 1 -0.667*** 0.172
Cut point 2 0.784*** 0.171
Technology areas
Bi-annual dummies
Number of Observations
Log-Likelihood
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
-3,745.117
6 areas
Included
5.347
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